Abstract. At Crypto 2005, Coron et al. showed that Merkle-Damgård hash function (MDHF) with a fixed input length random oracle is not indifferentiable from a random oracle RO due to the extension attack. Namely MDHF does not behave like RO. This result implies that there exists some cryptosystem secure in the RO model but insecure under MDHF. However, this does not imply that no cryptosystem is secure under MDHF. This fact motivates us to establish a criteria methodology for confirming cryptosystems security under MDHF.
Introduction
Indifferentiability Framework. Maurer et al. [9] introduced the indifferentiable framework as a notion stronger than indistinguishability. This framework deals with the security of two systems C(V) and C(U): for cryptosystem C, C(V) retains at least the same level of provable security of C(U) if primitive V is indifferentiable from primitive U, denoted by V < U. This definition will allow us to use construction V instead of U in any cryptosystem C and retain the same level of provable security due to the indifferentiability framework of Maurer et al. [9] . We denote "C(V) is at least as secure as C(U)" by C(V) C(U). More strictly, V < U ⇔ C(V) C(U) holds. This result implies that if cryptosystem C is secure in the U model and V < U holds, C is secure in the V model, and if U < V holds, there is some cryptosystem that is secure in the U model but insecure in the V model. Indifferentiability and the MD Construction. While many cryptosystems have been proven to be secure in the random oracle (RO) model [3] (e.g. FDH [3] , OAEP [4] , RSA-KEM [11] , Prefix-MAC [12] and so on), where RO is modeled as a monolithic entity (i.e. a black box working in domain {0, 1} * ), in practice most instantiations that use a hash function are usually constructed by iterating a fixed input length primitive (e.g. a compression function). There are many architectures based on iterated hash functions. The most well-known one is the Merkle-Damgård (MD) construction [6, 10] . A hash function with MD construction iterates underlying compression function f : {0, 1}
n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} n as follows. There is a significant gap between RO and hash functions, since hash functions are constructed from a small primitive f while RO is a monolithic random function. Coron et al. [5] made important observations on the cryptosystems that use the indifferentiable framework. They introduced the new iterated hash function property of indifferentiability from RO. In this framework, the underlying primitive, G, is a fixed input length random oracle (denoted here as FILRO or h) or an ideal block cipher. We say that hash function H G is indifferentiable from RO if there exists simulator S such that no distinguisher can distinguish H G from RO (S mimics G). The distinguisher can access RO/H G and S/G; S can access RO. A hash function that satisfies this property, H G , behaves like RO. Therefore, replacing the RO of any cryptosystem by H G does not destroy its security. Coron et al. analyzed the indifferentiability from RO for several specific constructions. For example, they have shown that MD h is not indifferentiable from RO due to the extension attack which uses the following property: The output value z = MD h (M ||m) can be calculated by c = h(z, m) where z = MD h (M ), so z = c. On the other hand, no S can return the output value z = RO(M ||m) from query (z, m) where z = RO(M ), since no S knows z from z and m, and z is chosen at random. Therefore, no S can simulate the extension attack. This result implies that MD h does not behave like RO and there exists some cryptosystem that is secure in the RO model but insecure under MD h due to the indifferentiability framework. Their solution was to propose several constructions such as Prefix-Free MD, chop MD, NMAC and HMAC. Hash functions with these constructions are, under h, indifferentiable from RO. It seems impossible to prove that the important original MD cryptosystem is secure.
MD Construction Dead?
The MD construction is among the most important foundations of modern cryptosystems [2, 5, 8] . There are two main reasons: -Applications of TRO hide the outputs of hash functions from adversaries. One example is OAEP encryption: Adversaries cannot know the outputs of the hash functions that are used for calculating a cipher text, since these values are hidden by a random value or a trapdoor one-way permutation. -TRO leaks useful information such that S can run the extension attack.
By considering the above points, it is convenient for S to obtain useful information from value z which is the output of RO(M ). Thus we define TRO that leaks input M on query z such that RO(M ) = z. Since S can obtain value M such that z = RO(M ), S can know value z = RO(M ||m) by using TRO. Therefore, S can run the extension attack. We will prove that MD h < TRO holds (Corollary 2).
Since the hash function outputs for OAEP and variants of OAEP (e.g. OAEP+) are hidden, adversaries cannot use TRO effectively. So we can easily confirm that these cryptosystems are secure in the TRO model.
Limitation of TRO.
Though TRO can easily confirm the security of many cryptosystems under MD h , there are several cryptosystems whose security we cannot confirm by TRO. For example, RSA-KEM is insecure in the TRO model (Theorem 7). It is possible that there are cryptosystems that are secure under MD h because TRO leaks information beyond that needed to simulate the extension attack. The essential information to simulate the extension attack is just z = RO(M ||m), but TRO leaks M , which is not essential.
Our response is to propose Extension Attack Simulatable Random Oracle ERO as RO.
Extension Attack Simulatable Random Oracle. We define ERO that leaks just z (= RO(M ||m)). By using ERO, S can run the extension attack, since S can know z . We will prove that MD h < ERO holds (Theorem 5). We will also prove that RSA-KEM is secure in the ERO model (Theorem 8 Since TRO leaks more information than ERO, we will prove ERO < TRO. Since ERO has wider applicability, we recommend that ERO be used for cryptosystems whose security cannot be proven in the TRO model. ERO v.s. RO. Since ERO leaks several bits of information in permitting the simulation of the extension attack, RO < ERO and ERO < RO explicitly hold. As evidence of the separation between RO and ERO, we pick up prefix MAC [12] which is secure in the RO model, and prove that prefix MAC is insecure in the ERO model (Theorem 4). Since ERO is equivalent to MD h , prefix MAC is also insecure in the MD h model.
Leakey Random Oracle. Leaky random oracle LRO was proposed by Yoneyama et al. [13] but with a different motivation. LRO has a function that leaks all query-response pairs of RO. In this paper, we will prove that TRO < LRO and LRO < TRO hold. Therefore, all cryptosystems secure in the LRO model are also secure in the TRO model and there is some cryptosystem that is insecure in the LRO model but secure in the TRO model. Since FDH is secure in LRO model [13] , FDH is secure under MD h . Since OAEP is insecure in the LRO model [13] and secure in the TRO model, OAEP is evidence of the separation between LRO and TRO.
Remarks. First we compare LRO, TRO and ERO from the viewpoint of security proofs of cryptosystems. LRO, TRO, and ERO consist of RO and the additional oracle (denote LO, TO and EO respectively). Since LO leaks more information to adversaries than TO, adversaries that are given LRO have more flexible strategies than adversaries given TRO. That is, security proofs in the LRO model are more complex than those in the TRO model. The same is true for TRO and ERO.
Finally, for the security proof of cryptosystem C(MD h ) we compare the direct proof in MD h with the proof via ERO. Since MD h has the MD structure, we must consider this structure in the direct proof. On the other hand, since ERO does not have this structure, we does not need to consider it. For example we must consider the events of inner collisions for MD h in the direct proof. However this is not necessary for the proof in the ERO model. Moreover, since we can reuse existing proofs for the simulation of RO in the security proof in the ERO model, we only consider the simulation of EO in the security proof. Therefore, the security proof in the ERO model is easier than the direct proof in MD h . Since ERO = MD h holds, we can confirm a cryptosystems security under MD h by proving its security in ERO, an easier task than a direct proof.
Related Works. Recently, Dodis et al. independently proposed a methodology to salvage the original and modified MD constructions in many applications [7] . They found two properties: one is preimage awareness (PrA), and the other is public-use random oracle (pub-RO). pub-RO is the same as LRO. The approach of pub-RO is almost same as our approach of LRO. Dodis et al. pointed out that the security of cryptosystems that satisfy the following property can be easily proven in the pub-RO model: all inputs of hash functions are public to the adversaries. Therefore, PSS and the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme, and other, are easily proven to be secure in the pub-RO model by using existing proofs in the RO model. Since LRO(pub-RO) < TRO and TRO < LRO(pub-RO) hold, TRO and ERO have more applications than LRO(pub-RO) (e.g. OAEP is secure in the TRO model but insecure in the pub-RO model). The approach of PrA is interesting in that this approach can treat the case where the compression function f requirement is relaxed from FILRO to property PrA. It seems, however, that this approach is not effective in saving the original MD construction, since this approach modifies MD construction by processing the output of the MD construction by FILRO.
Cryptosystems Security under the Merkle-Damgård Hash Function.
PSS, Fiat-Shamir, and so on are secure under MD h thanks to pub-RO [7] , OAEP and variants of OAEP are secure under MD h thanks to TRO, and RSA-KEM is secure under MD h thanks to ERO. Since many cryptosystems are secure under MD h , the original Merkle-Damgård construction is still alive!
Preliminaries

Merkle-Damgård Construction
We first give a short description of the Merkle-
where pad is a padding function such that pad :
return c n
In this paper we ignore the above padding function, this does not degrade generality, so hereafter we discuss MD f : ({0, 1} t ) * → {0, 1} n . We use random oracle compression function h as f where h : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} n . Thus we discuss below hash function MD h with MD construction using h.
Random Oracle
RO : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n can be realized as follows. RO has initially the empty hash list
, and returns z.
Leaky Random Oracle
LRO was proposed by Yoneyama et al. [13] . LRO can be realized as follows. LRO consists of RO and LO. On a leak query to LO, LO outputs the entire contents of L RO . We can define S that can simulate the extension attack by using LRO, since S can know M from z by using LO and can know z by posing M ||m to RO.
Indifferentiability
The indifferentiability framework generalizes the fundamental concept of the indistinguishability of two cryptosystems C(U) and C(V) where C(U) is the cryptosystem C that invokes the underlying primitive U and C(V) is the cryptosystem C that invokes the underlying primitive V. U and V have two interfaces: public and private interfaces. Adversaries can only access the public interfaces and honest parties (e.g. the cryptosystem C) can access only the private interface.
We denote the private interface of the system W by W priv and the public interface of the system W by W pub . The definition of indifferentiability is as follows. This definition will allow us to use construction V instead of U in any cryptosystem C and retain the same level of provable security due to the indifferentiability theory of Maurer et al. [9] . We denote "C(V) is at least as secure as If
Definition 1. V is indifferentiable from U, denote V < U, if for any distinguisher D with binary output (0 or 1) there is a polynomial time simulator
S such that |P r[D V priv ,V pub ⇒ 1]− P r[D U priv ,S(U pub ) ⇒ 1]| < .C(U)" by C(V) C(U). Namely, C(V) C(U) denotes the case that if C(U) is secure, then C(V) is secure. More strictly, V < U ⇔ C(V) C(U) holds.
Extension Attack
. This is because no simulator can obtain the output value of RO(M ||m) from just (z, m) and the output value of RO(M ||m) is independently and randomly defined from c. Therefore, MD h < RO holds.
Variants of Random Oracles
In this section, we will introduce several variants of random oracles in order for S to simulate the extension attack described above, and then show the relationships among these oracles within the indifferentiability framework.
Definition of Variants of Random Oracles
Traceable Random Oracle: TRO consists of RO and TO. On trace query z,
We can define S that can simulate the extension attack by using TRO, since S can know M from z by using TO and can know z by posing M ||m to RO.
Extension Attack Simulatable Random Oracle: TRO leaks too much information to simulate the extension attack. So we define ERO such that S is given just the important information. The important information is value z such that z = RO(M ||m). Therefore, we define ERO as follows. ERO consists of RO and EO. EO has initially the empty list L EO and can look into L RO . On simulation query (m, z) to EO where |m| = t, 
n at random, L EO ← (m, z, z ) and returns z .
We can construct S that can simulate the extension attack by using ERO, since S can obtain z from (m, z) where z = RO(M ||m) by using EO.
Relationships among LRO, TRO, ERO, and RO Models within the Indifferentiability Framework
LRO leaks more information of L RO than TRO, and TRO leaks more information of L RO than ERO. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that anything secure in the LRO model is also secure in the TRO model, anything secure in the TRO model is also secure in the ERO model, and any cryptosystem secure in the ERO model is also secure in the RO model. We prove the validity of these suppositions by using the indifferentiability framework. First we clarify the relationship between TRO and LRO.
Theorem 1. TRO < LRO and LRO < TRO.
Proof. We construct S which simulates TO by using LRO as follows. Given query z, S poses a leak query to LO and receives the entire information of L RO . If there exists pairs such that
, since the output from each step of S is equal to that from each step of TO.
LRO < TRO is trivial, since no S cannot acquire all values in L RO by using TRO.
Since TRO < LRO, any cryptosystem secure in the LRO model is also secure in the TRO model by the indifferentiability framework. Since LRO < TRO, there exists some cryptosystem that is secure in the TRO model but insecure in the LRO model. For example, Yoneyama et al. proved that OAEP is insecure in the LRO model [13] . Since OAEP is secure in the TRO model, OAEP is evidence of the separation between LRO and TRO.
Next we will clarify the relationship between ERO and TRO.
Theorem 2. ERO < TRO and TRO < ERO.
Proof. We construct S which simulates EO by using TRO as follows. TRO < ERO is trivial, since no S cannot decide whether there exists (M, z) in L RO or not by using ERO.
Since ERO < TRO, any cryptosystem secure in the TRO model is also secure in the ERO model in the indifferentiability framework. Since TRO < ERO, there exists some cryptosystem that is secure in the ERO model but insecure in the TRO model. We will prove that RSA-KEM is secure in the ERO model but insecure in the TRO model in Section 5. Therefore, RSA-KEM is evidence of the separation between TRO and ERO.
Finally we will clarify the relationship between RO and ERO. We will show that Prefix MAC fails to satisfy unforgeability for MAC schemes in the ERO model.
Theorem 4 (Insecurity of Prefix MAC in the ERO model). Prefix MAC does not satisfy unforgeability for MAC schemes where H is modeled as ERO.
Proof. A forgery procedure is as follows: forger F obtains a valid pair of (M, h) from M AC, where h = H(K||M ). F sends (h, m) to EO, and obtains h = H(K||M ||m). Since M ||m is not queried to M AC, F succeeds in Existential forgery of known message attack (EF-KMA) attack using ERO H.
Therefore, Prefix-MAC is secure in the RO model but insecure in the ERO model. Consequently, Prefix-MAC is evidence of the separation between ERO and RO. From the above discussions, the following corollary is obtained. Corollary 1. RO < ERO < TRO < LRO, and LRO < TRO < ERO < RO.
Relationship between MD h and ERO in the Indifferentiability Framework
In this section we prove that MD h < ERO and ERO < MD h hold as follows. In theorem 5, we use statements σ H and q h instead of the total number of queries q. σ H is the total number of message blocks for RO/MD h and q h is the total number of queries to S/h 
Corollary 2. RO < MD
h = ERO < TRO < LRO, and LRO < TRO < ERO = MD h < RO
Proof of Theorem 5
First we define simulator S as follows. S has a list T which is initially empty. We define chain triples as follows.
Definition 2 (Chain Triples). Triples
Simulator S: On a query (x, m),
If ∃(x, m, y) ∈ T , it outputs y.
Else if chain triples
∃(x 1 , m 1 , y 1 ), ..., (x i , m i , y i ) ∈ T such that x = y i , y ← RO(m 1 ||.
..||m i ||m).
Else, y ← EO(m, x).
T ← (x, m, y).
S returns y.
Since S needs to search pairs in T , this requires at most O(q 2 h ) time. We need to prove that S cannot tell apart two scenarios, ERO and MD h . In one scenario D has oracle access to RO and S while in the other D has access to MD h and h. The proof involves a hybrid argument starting in the ERO scenario, and ending in the MD h scenario through a sequence of mutually indistinguishable hybrid games.
We give six events that allow D to distinguish MD h from ERO. These events arise from the fact that MD h has the MD construction but ERO does not. We explain these events as follows. Details of these events are given in Game 3.
First we discuss distinguishing events that occur due to differences among RO and MD h . RO and MD h return a random value unless collision occurs. Therefore, distinguishing events occur when collision occurs. When a collision of MD h occurs, one of following events occurs due to the MD construction: an output of h is equal to IV (event E1) or a collision of h occurs (event E2). On the other hand, since RO is a monolithic function, these events don't occur. Therefore, these events are distinguishing events between MD h and ERO. Second, we discuss distinguishing events that occur due to differences among S and h. such that x = IV holds, S can know MD h (M ||m) by using EO. Therefore, S can simulate the relation. If such a pair does not exist ((M, x) ∈ L RO ), since S cannot know M , S cannot know the value of RO(M ||m). Therefore, S cannot simulate the relation (event E3 and event E5). If two or more such pairs exist ((M, x), (M , x), · · · ∈ L RO ), S must simulate the relation such that RO(M ||m) = RO(M ||m) =, · · ·. However, since S cannot control the outputs of RO, it cannot simulate the relation (event E4).
On the other hand, if ∃(M, x) ∈ L RO such that x = IV , S must simulate the relation such that RO(m) = RO(M ||m). However, since S cannot control the outputs of RO, it cannot simulate the relation (event E6).
In following game transforms, since the MD construction is considered in Game 3 for the first time, we discuss these events in the transform from Game 2 to Game 3. In this discussion, we show that if distinguishing events don't occur, Game 3 is identical to Game 2, and the probability that one of the events will occur is negligible. 
Game 3:
In this game, we modify the relay algorithm R 0 into R 1 as follows. For hash oracle query M , R 1 applies the MD construction to M by querying S. R 1 is essentially the same as MD h except that R 1 is based on S instead of the fixed input length random oracle h.
We show that Game 3 is identical with Game 2 unless the following bad events occur. In response to query (x, m), S chooses response y ∈ {0, 1} n :
-E1: It is the case that y = IV . and in a response to a query M to RO, RO returns z:
There is a triple (x , m , y ) ∈ T such that z = x .
We demonstrate that Game 3 is identical with Game 2 unless bad events occur and the probability that bad events occur is negligible. Before we demonstrate these facts, we give an useful property as follows. (x 1 , m 1 , y 1 chain triples (x 1 , m 1 , y 1 ), ..., (x t , m t , y t ) are already stored in T such that y t = y i−1 (case A-1) and chain triples are not stored in T (case A-2). The case A-1 is equal to collision of MD S . Therefore a collision of S occurs or an output of S is equal to IV in this case. Therefore event E1 or E2 occurs. In the case A-2, since y i = RO(m 1 ||...||m i ) holds from the definition of S, this is contrary to the assumption.
Lemma 1. For any chain triples
We discuss the case B. In this case, we divided two cases: i = 1 (case B-1) and i = 1 (case B-2). In the case B-1, y 1 = RO(m 1 ) holds due to the definition of S. This is contrary to the assumption. In the case B-2, since x i = IV , y i−1 = IV holds. Therefore event E1 or E6 occurs.
We discuss the case C. In this case, (M, x i ) is already in L RO , when y i is defined. We consider two cases:
In the case C-1, y i = RO(m 1 ||...||m i ) holds and this is contrary to the assumption. In the case C-2, we consider two case: y i−1 is chosen at random by EO (case C-2-1) and y i−1 is defined by RO (case C-2-2). For the case C-2-1, from the definition of S, when (
Assume that j is the maximum number. Therefore y j+1 , ..., y i−1 are defined at random by EO and independent from RO. (x j+1 , m j+1 , y j+1 ) is stored in T before (x j , m j , y j ) is stored in T . If y j is defined at random by EO and independent from RO, event E3 occurs. If y j is defined by RO (y i = RO(m 1 ||...||m j )), event E5 occurs. The case C-2-2 is equal to event E4.
Finally we discuss the case D. From the same discussion of the case C-2-1, bad event E3 or E5 occurs.
For the view of D for R 0 and R 1 , from Lemma 1, for any M , R 1 (M ) = RO(M ) holds unless bad events occur. Therefore the view of D for R 0 is equal to that for R 1 . For consistency in Game 2, from the definition of S and Lemma 1, for any chain triples (x 1 , m 1 , y 1 
..||m i ) holds unless bad events occur. Therefore, the answers given by S are consistent with those given by R 0 . For consistency in Game 3, from the definition of S, the definition of R 1 and Lemma 1, for any chain triples (x 1 , m 1 , y 1 
..||m i ) holds unless bad events occur. Therefore, the answers given by S are consistent with those given by R 1 . Therefore, Game 3 is identical with Game 2 unless bad events occur.
Next we examine the probability that bad events occur as follows.
Lemma 2. P r[E1
where q 1 is the maximum number of invoking the simulator and q 2 is the maximum number of invoking RO.
Proof. We will examine each of the three events and bound their probability. Since outputs of S are chosen at random, P r[E1] ≤ q1 2 n . Since E2 is the event where a collision occurs,
2 n . Since y is chosen at random, the probability that event E3 ≤ and the probability that bad events occur in Game 3 is less than
Game 4:
In this Game, we modify simulator S to S 1 . RO is removed from simulator S 1 as follows.
Simulator S 1 : On query (x, m), The output of S is chosen at random or chosen by RO. Therefore, for any fresh query to S, the response is chosen at random. Since RO is invoked only by S, no D can access RO. Namely, no D distinguish S 1 from S, though RO is removed in S 1 , so Game 4 is identical to Game 3. Let G4 denote the event that distinguisher D outputs 1 in Game 4. P r[G4] = P r[G3] holds.
Game 5. This is the final game of our argument. Here we finally replace S 1 with the fixed input length random oracle h. Let G5 denote the event that distinguisher D outputs 1 in Game 5. Since for a new query S 1 responds with a random value and for a repeated query S 1 responds a repeated value, Game 5 is identical to Game 4. Therefore, we can deduce that P r
Now we can complete the proof of Theorem by combining Games 1 to 5, and observing that Game 1 is the same as ERO scenario while Game 5 is same as MD h scenario. Hence we can deduce that ≤
Proof of Theorem 6
We define simulator S that simulates EO. S has initially empty list L S . On query (m, z), S is defined as follows: z ← h(z, m), and it returns z . The simulator's running time requires at most O(q EO ) time.
We need to prove that S cannot tell apart two scenarios, MD h and ERO scenarios, one where D has oracle access to MD h and S and the other where D has access to RO and EO. The proof involves a hybrid argument starting in the MD h scenario, and ending in the ERO scenario through a sequence of mutually indistinguishable hybrid games.
Game 1: This is the MD
h scenario, where D has oracle access to MD h and S(h). Let G1 denote the event that D outputs 1 after interacting with MD h and
Game 2:
In this game, we change the underlying primitive of MD from h to S. Thus D interacts with MD S and S(h). For any query to S, S poses it to h and returns the value received from h. Let G2 denote the event that D outputs 1 in Game 2. Since the view of D remains unchanged in this game, so
Game 3:
In this game, we remove S and h and insert EO and RO. In this game, D interacts with MD EO and EO and does not access to RO. Since for a fresh query EO returns a fresh random value and for a repeated query EO returns the corresponding value, Game 3 is identical with Game 2. Let G3 denote the event that D outputs 1 in Game 3. Since the view of D remains unchanged in this game, so P r
Game 4. This is the final game of our argument. In this game, we remove MD EO and D interacts with RO and EO. We show that Game 4 is identical with Game 3 unless following bad events occur and probability that bad events occur is negligible.
Bad events are as follows. On query (m, x), EO returns y:
On query M , RO returns z:
We demonstrate that Game 4 is identical with Game 3 unless bad events occur and the probability that bad events occur is negligible. Before we demonstrate these facts, we give an useful property as follows. , x 1 , y 1 
Lemma 3. For any chain triples
..||m i ) holds unless bad events occur. Therefore, the answers given by S are consistent with those given by MD EO . For consistency in Game 4, from Lemma 3, for any chain triples (x 1 , m 1 , y 1 
..||m i ) holds unless bad events occur. Therefore, the answers given by S are consistent with those given by RO. Therefore, Game 4 is identical with Game 3 unless bad events occur.
where q 1 is the maximum number of invoking EO and q 2 is the maximum number of invoking RO.
Due to lack of space we omit this proof.
Let G4 denote the event that the distinguisher D outputs 1 in Game 4, B3 be the event that Bad1 ∨ Bad2 ∨ Bad3 occurs in Game 3 and B4 be the event that Bad1 ∨ Bad2 ∨ Bad3 occurs in Game 4. Therefore
MGF1 Transform
In the above discussions, we ignored range extension algorithms such as MGF1 which is an instantiated hash function of OAEP. When we consider these algorithms, we need to modify TRO and ERO. Due to the lack of space, we only modify TRO for MGF1 as follows and will discuss ERO in the full paper. When H is a random oracle, we can see H( * || [1] ), ..., H( * || [j] ) as independent random oracles RO 1 , ..., RO j . In order to prove M GF 1(TRO) < TRO , we need to find a simulator that simulates each TO of RO 1 , ..., RO j . The simulator of TO of RO s can be easily shown by using queries (s, * ) to TO . Therefore, we can prove M GF 1(TRO) < TRO .
Cryptosystems that are secure in the TRO model are also secure in the TRO model by discussions similar to those for the cases of TRO. Note that security bound of these cryptosystems is dependent on n, not jn.
The same discussion can be applied to KDF3 which is an instantiated hash function of RSA-KEM [11] .
Security Analysis of RSA-KEM in TRO and ERO Models
The RSA-based key encapsulation mechanism (RSA-KEM) scheme [11] is a secure KEM scheme in the RO model. In this section, we consider the security of RSA-KEM in the TRO and ERO models. The notation of the scheme follows that in [11] . The security of RSA-KEM in the RO model is proved as follows;
Lemma 5 (Security of RSA-KEM in the RO model [11] ). If the RSA problem is hard, then RSA-KEM satisfies IND-CCA for KEM where KDF is modeled as RO.
Insecurity of RSA-KEM in TRO Model
Though RSA-KEM is secure in the RO model, it is insecure in the TRO model. 
Security of RSA-KEM in ERO Model
We can also prove the security of RSA-KEM in the ERO model as well as in the RO model. The proof will be described in the full paper.
